In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.
Introduction
In operations research, sequencing situations are characterized by a finite number of jobs lined up in front of one (or more) machine(s) that have to be processed on the machine(s). A single decision maker wants to determine a processing order of the jobs that minimizes a cost criterion and takes into account possible restriction on the jobs (e.g. due dates, precedence constraints, etc.) This single decision maker problem can be transformed into a multiple decision maker problem by taking agents into account who own at least one job. In such a model a group of agents (coalition) can save costs by cooperation. For the determination of the maximal cost savings of a coalition one has to solve the combinatorial optimization problem corresponding to this coalition.
This approach has been taken first in Curiel et al. (1989) . They introduce sequencing games, which arise from one-machine sequencing situations, and showed that these games are convex, and thus, balanced. Moreover, they introduce and characterize an allocation rule that divides the maximal cost savings that can be obtained by complete cooperation.
The paper by Curiel et al. (1989) has inspired researchers to study the interaction between scheduling theory and cooperative game theory. Hamers et al. (1996) and Van Velzen and Hamers (2002) investigate the class of sequencing situations as in considered Curiel et al. (1989) . The first paper focuses on the structure of a subset of the core, the split core, and the second paper introduces new classes of balanced sequencing games. Van den Nouweland et al. (1992) , Hamers et al. (1999) and Calleja et al. (2002) investigate sequencing games that arise from multiple-machine sequencing situations. These papers focus on the balancedness of the related sequencing games.
In the class of sequencing situations considered in Curiel et al. (1989) no restrictions like ready times or due dates are imposed on the jobs. Hamers et al. (1995) included ready times (or release dates) on the one-machine sequencing situations considered by Curiel et al. (1989) . In this case the corresponding sequencing games are balanced, but are not necessarily convex. For a special subclass, however, convexity could be established. Similar results are also obtained in Borm et al. (2002) , in which due dates are imposed on the jobs. This paper is in the same line as Hamers et al. (1995) and Borm et al. (2002) . Here, precedence relations are imposed on the job in one-machine sequencing situations. Precedence relations prescribe an order in which jobs have to be processed. More specifically, some jobs can only be processed if some other job(s) have already been processed. In practice many examples can be found where precedence relations play a role. For example, scheduling programs on a computer. In many cases one program needs the output of another program as input data. Another situation where precedence relations are involved is in the manufacturing of a car. Before you can paint the car you need to have the chassis, before you can place the wheels you need already the axles, etc. In this paper we establish a convexity result for sequencing games that arise from sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are involved.
There are several arguments to ask for convexity. Convex (or supermodular) games are known to have nice properties, in the sense that some solutions concepts for these games coincide and others have intuitive descriptions. For example, for convex games the core is the convex hull of all marginal vectors (cf. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) ), and, as a consequence, the Shapley value is the barycentre of the core (Shapley (1971) ). Moreover, the bargaining set and the core coincide, the kernel coincides with the nucleolus (Maschler et al. (1972) ) and the τ -value can easily be calculated (Tijs (1981) ). The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce one-machine precedence sequencing situations and the related precedence sequencing games. We present our convexity result in Section 3. In the Appendix we prove rather technical lemmata needed for the convexity result of Section 3.
Precedence sequencing situations and games
In this section we describe a one-machine sequencing situation in which precedence relations hold for the jobs. Moreover, we define the corresponding sequencing games.
In a one-machine precedence sequencing situation there is a queue of agents, each with one job, before a machine (counter). Each agent (player) has to process his job on the machine. The finite set of agents is denoted by N , and its cardinality by . . , n } on the jobs of the players before the processing of the machine starts.
A precedence sequencing situation as described above is denoted by (1)
The following example illustrates a precedence sequencing game in case the precedence relation is a tree. . Then the worth of the connected coalitions is Note that (1) implies that precedence sequencing games are σ 0 -component additive games, and, thus, balanced (cf. Curiel et al. (1994) ). Recall that a game
Example 2.1 Let
is called balanced if its core is non-empty. The core consists of all vectors that distribute v ( N ) , i.e., the revenues incurred when all players in N cooperate, among the players in such a way that no subset of players can be better off by seceding from the rest of the players and acting on their own behalf. That is, a vector 
Convexity of precedence sequencing games
In this section we will establish the convexity of the precedence sequencing games corresponding to situations in which the precedence relations consist of parallel chains and the initial order is a concatenation of these chains.
The following example shows that precedence sequencing games that arise from a sequencing situation in which the precedence relation is a tree need not be convex. Recall that a game
(2) 
be a precedence sequencing situation. Then P is said to be a network of parallel chains if each player precedes at most one player and is preceded by at most one player, i.e., for each . . , C
. Without loss of generality we assume that the order of the chains is 1 , .
. . , C . The following example illustrates a concatenation of chains. 
Example 3.2 Let
, and
. The only two possible initial orders are For determining the precedence sequencing game corresponding to a sequencing situation in which the precedence relation is a concatenation of chains, we need an optimal order for each coalition. Therefore, we need the following additional notations and definitions. The following theorem follows from Sidney (1975) . is optimal for coalition S given the precedence relation . It follows from (1) .
The following lemmata describe relations between urgency indices, which facilitate the proof of our main result. .
Proof. Follows immediately from the definition of the Sidney-components and Lemma 3.5.
To prove our main result we need the following notation. . Extending to two collections
.
(3) Proof. The initial order is a concatenation of chains. Without loss of generality we assume that the order of the chains is 1 , 2 , .
. . , C
. We have to show that (2) . Now define (see Figure 1 for an illustration) 
where the second equality holds by (3). Hence, (2) is satisfied if expression (5) is nonnegative. . Similarly, it can be shown that Rewriting the first two terms of (5) we obtain
where the second equality follows from . Rewriting the last two terms of (5) we obtain :
) .
The first inequality follows from the definition of U *
( b )
. The second inequality follows from
Substituting (6) and (7) in (5) 
(8)
To show that expression (8) is nonnegative, we will prove that
. This implies, using the assumption
. As a result expression (8) 
. Then using Lemma 3.5 it follows that
. This implies that
and using Lemma 3.5 it follows that
. The proof that
runs similarly. 
where the second equality holds because are disconnected. We will show that expression (9) as well as expression (10) is nonnegative.
which shows that expression (9) is nonnegative. 
which shows that expression (10) is nonnegative. Hence (2) Finally we illustrate that convexity is lost if the initial order is not a concatenation of chains. 
is not convex. , which is a contradiction to the assumption that the Sidney-component of 
Appendix
S ∪ { i , j } containing i is { i } ∪ m − 1 l = 1 A l ∪ B .i , j } ) − v ( S ∪ { i } ) − v ( S ∪ { j } ) + v ( S ) = G ( C 1 ( S ∪ { i , j } ) , C 4 ( S ∪ { i , j } ) ) − G ( C 1 ( S ∪ { i } ) ,C
